Socrates And Euthyphro Walk into a Bar…

Socrates orders a “Doubt on the Rocks.” Euthyphro opts for a “Divine Justice.” Promptly, Socrates inquires, “Is that drink just because it’s holy, or holy because it’s just?” Euthyphro, exasperated, switches to water. This scene epitomizes the core discussion of Plato’s Euthyphro. Euthyphro is convinced he understands the essence of holiness and justice, while Socrates, true to form, challenges every assertion Euthyphro makes. The dialogue positions Socrates in a pivotal role, leading to a central conclusion: justice prevails over holiness.

But does it?

(Quick pronunciation guide for Euthyphro: It’s ‘YOO,’ as if you’re surprised, then ‘thi’ like in ‘think,’ and finish with ‘fro,’ reminiscent of a trendy 1970s hairstyle. Combined, it’s “YOO-thi-fro.”).

If you haven’t read Euthyphro, or need a refresher, here’s how it starts: Euthyphro prosecutes his father for impiety after his father left a laborer (who had killed a slave) bound in a ditch while seeking legal counsel. The laborer died before any decision was made. Euthyphro believes his actions are pious, despite his family’s criticism of his severe judgment against his own father. This predicament sets the stage for Socrates’ probing into the nature of piety.

The discussion begins with Socrates confronting Euthyphro, challenging his motives for his father’s prosecution. Socrates demands a definition of holiness, which Euthyphro tries to sidestep by shifting the focus to justice, using Zeus’ rebellion against his own father as a justification. After some debate, Euthyphro tentatively agrees that holiness is “what is loved by the gods.”

Socrates examines this definition by questioning if actions are loved by the gods because they are just, or just because the gods love them. This introduces the famous Euthyphro dilemma:

“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”

ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;

For tangible concepts like numbers or sizes, truths can be discerned through measurable metrics, Socrates claims. However, moral questions about justice, honor, or virtue lack such quantitative measures.

However, at least it’s agreed that “the holy is loved for the reason that it is holy, but it’s not holy because it’s loved.” Socrates argues that the god’s love ultimately does not determine whether something is holy; on the same account, this holiness cannot be applied to determine what is just. This is summed up in Socrates’ remark: “…in my view, my good man, no one, be he god or man, would have the nerve to argue that the wrongdoer should not be punished.” Even if the gods were to love a wrongdoer and endow him with “holiness,” they still could not be exempt from the confines of justice.

Ultimately, via syllogistic reasoning and taking a taxonomical approach to virtues, Socrates holds that just as odd numbers are subsets of numbers, holiness is a subset of justice. Justice exists independently of holiness, yet where holiness is found, there must be justice. Socrates seems to believe that justice is a complicated ethical and rational balance of one’s actions. In contrast, holiness is only a subset of justice that relates more specifically to our duties of service and attendance or “trades” with the gods.